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Abstract
We experimentally analyze equilibrium discovery in i) a pure call auction, ii) a call auction pre-
ceded by a nonbinding preopening period, and iii) a call auction preceded by a binding preopening
period. We examine whether a preopening period can facilitate coordination on the Pareto dom-
inant equilibrium. During the nonbinding preopening period, traders tend to place manipulative
orders. After observing such orders, participants learn to distrust cheap talk and coordinate less
on Pareto dominant outcomes. In contrast, we find that, when preopening orders are binding, they
improve the ability to coordinate on high gains from trade.
Keywords: Cheap talk, experimental markets, equilibrium discovery, preopening period.
1 Introduction
Discovering equilibrium prices and orders at the opening of stock markets is a difficult task, es-
pecially because liquidity externalities can generate equilibrium multiplicity.1 To facilitate price
discovery and coordination on high liquidity, several bourses start with a preopening period where
investors can place orders, and indicative prices are set and disseminated.2 But, to the extent that
preopening orders can be cancelled, traders can use them to manipulate the market.3 This could
prevent the preopening from facilitating coordination. Market designers have introduced certain
features to deter such manipulation. For example, as is the case on Xetra, the German comput-
erized stock exchange, the exact time of the opening can be random.4 Or cancellations can be
costly. This paper offers an experimental investigation of three market mechanisms, inspired by
those prevailing in actual stock exchanges.
We study a simple trading game where, depending on parameter values there is one or two pure
strategy Nash equilibria. In the first case, corresponding to low liquidity, the unique equilibrium
generates low gains from trade. In the second case, one of the pure strategy equilibria involves
low liquidity and low gains from trade, while the other involves high liquidity and high gains from
trade. The former equilibrium is risk dominant, while the latter is Pareto dominant. In that context,
coordinating on equilibrium is likely to be difficult.5 We study under what conditions a preopening
period can facilitate such coordination and foster high gains from trade.
Our experimental investigation of preopening mechanisms is directly in line with analyses of
preplay communication and cheap talk (see Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross (1992), Crawford
(1998), Charness (2000), Clark, Kay and Sefton (2001) and Blume and Ortmann (2007)).6 The
first major difference between our analysis and this literature is that we compare three market
mechanisms:
• A pure one-shot call auction where buyers and sellers submit limit orders and the uniform
price is set to clear the market.
• A call market preceded by a nonbinding preopening period. In this treatment, the call market
is held twice in each replication of the experiment. At time 0, participants place nonbinding
1See Pagano (1989), Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Dow (2004).
2Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1999) document the information content of these prices in the Paris Bourse.
3Davies (2003) investigates whether preopening trades on the Toronto Stock Exchange are manipulative.
4In the description of the Xetra market model, one can read: “The call phase has a random end after a minimum
period in order to avoid price manipulation” (Deutsche Bo¨rse, 2004, page 20).
5Van Huyck et al (1990) and Battalio, Samuelson and Van Huyck (2001) document experimentally the occurrence
of coordination failures.
6While the above mentioned papers, like ours, consider a symmetric information environment, Forsythe et al
(1999) consider the adverse selection case. They find that, even in that context, preplay communication can improve
efficiency. Crawford (1998) offers a survey encompassing both symmetric information and private information analy-
ses.
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orders and purely indicative prices are set and disseminated. But no trade takes place. Then
these orders are cancelled and, at time 1, participants place firm orders, which are taken into
account to determine the price and the trades.
• A call market preceded by a binding preopening period. In that game, traders have the
option to place orders at time 0. If they do so, those orders are firm and cannot be cancelled.
Alternatively, the traders can wait until time 1 to participate in the call auction.
While our experimental setting is admittedly extremely simple and stylized, these three market
mechanisms capture some salient features of the opening of real stock exchanges, namely the
ability to place orders prior to the opening and the fact that canceling these orders can be more
or less difficult or costly. Thus, comparing the performance of our experimental market structures
can offer some insights useful for the design of exchanges.
The second major difference between our paper and previous literature is that we study the
effect of history on participants’ behavior.7 Some traders first start with a game where potential
equilibrium gains from trade are high, and then experience a situation with low liquidity and low
gains from trade. Other participants experience the opposite sequence. The idea is that in real
economic situations, and in particular stock exchanges, market conditions and potential gains from
trade vary through time. We designed our experiment to generate, in a simple way, such variability.
As market conditions change, the set of equilibria is altered and so is the scope for coordination
and gains from trade. Our experiment offers an opportunity to study how participants exposed to
different histories form different beliefs and realize different outcomes.
Our experiment was run in the Toulouse University laboratory, with 156 master students, who
each played 15 replications of the game and received financial rewards proportional to their gains.
Interactions were computerized and anonymous, and participants were randomly matched at each
period to rule out any repeated game effect.
Our main experimental results are the following. When there is a unique equilibrium with
low liquidity, there is no scope for coordination on high gains from trade. Yet, with a nonbinding
preopening, traders initially send manipulative orders during the preopening, falsely promising to
supply plentiful liquidity. Then they betray these promises in the call auction.8 After observing
such behavior, participants learn to mistrust nonbinding preplay communication. This results in
limited gains from trade, even when the market then moves to the situation where there is a Pareto
dominant equilibrium with high gains from trade. Hence, the opportunity to engage in preplay
7Schmidt et al (2003) also study the role of history and the impact of parameter changes on behaviour. But they
consider only coordination games, while we also consider prisoners’ dilemmas. And they don’t consider preplay
communication.
8The analysis of Charness (2000) also covers the case of a prisoner’s dilemma. In that case, he finds that coopera-
tion is announced 79% of the time but played only 10% of the time. Our results are in line with his findings.
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communication during the nonbinding preopening period does not enhance coordination on the
Pareto dominant equilibrium. In contrast, with a binding preopening period, traders cannot send
manipulative orders. Correspondingly, we find that the binding preopening mechanism enhances
coordination on the high liquidity and high gains from trade equilibrium.
Our results suggest that preplay communication mechanisms can be fragile. Underscoring
this fragility is one contribution of our paper relative to the previous literature. Cooper, DeJong,
Forsythe and Ross (1992), Charness (2000) and Blume and Ortmann (2007) find that, in a co-
operation game, nonbinding preplay communication fosters coordination on the Pareto dominant
equilibrium when the parameters of the game are constant. In contrast, we consider the case where
participants face varying parameter constellations, some for which coordinating on Pareto domi-
nant outcomes is feasible, others in which such win-win situations are not equilibrium outcomes.
We show that the latter situation generates bitter experiences, which then precludes coordination
via nonbinding preplay communication.9
Another contribution of our paper is to suggest an alternative mechanism to pure cheap talk,
in which this problem is mitigated. In our experiment, when preopening orders are binding, co-
ordination on the Pareto dominant equilibrium is often observed. And this is robust to bad initial
conditions, with low initial gains from trade. In this market structure, indeed, participants don’t
have the opportunity to make false promises and then breach them. Thus, they can’t loose trust in
the possibility to coordinate on win-win situations. And they take advantage of the sequencing of
the game to coordinate on high gains from trade. The corresponding high performance of the mar-
ket with a binding preopening period, observed in our experiment, is in line with the predictions of
the trembling hand equilibrium concept.
The next section describes our trading game, its equilibria and our hypotheses. Section 3
presents the experimental design. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes. The instruc-
tions given to the participants are in the appendix.
2 The trading game
In financial markets, opening prices are often set in uniform price auctions, referred to as call
auctions. This is the case, for instance, in the two major European stock markets: Euronext and
Xetra, as well as in other bourses throughout the world, such as, e.g., the Brazilian stock exchange.
Recognizing that equilibrium discovery is a difficult task, several market organizers have designed
9Note also that, in our setup, preplay announcements to play the Pareto dominant equilibrium are not self-enforcing
in the Aumann (1990) sense. This differs from the case studied by Cooper et al (1992). Clark et al (2001) also study
preplay communication in a setting where announces are not self enforcing. They find that cooperation is announced
81% of the time, but played only 42% of the time. Our results on the nonbinding preopening period are consistent
with their findings.
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preplay communication mechanisms. Thus, Euronext or the Brazilian and the Australian stock
exchanges feature a preopening period whereby traders can submit or cancel limit orders and ten-
tative prices are set (see Biais, Hillion and Spatt, 1999). In this section, we present a stylized
trading game designed to capture some important features of such markets. There is one buyer and
one seller who differ in terms of their private valuation of the asset. The buyer assigns value v = 4
to the asset, up to q¯ units, and then 0. The cost to the seller of providing the good is c = 0 up to q¯
units, and then infinity. Potential gains from trade for q¯ units are: (v− c)q¯ = 4q¯. The players know
the structure and the parameters of the game, i.e., we consider a complete information setting.
2.1 The call auction without preopening
In the pure call auction without preopening period, buyers and sellers simultaneously post sched-
ules of limit orders, and thus demand and supply curves. Once the orders have been placed, the
supply and demand curves are confronted and the price is set to maximize the number of shares
traded. This is a uniform price double auction, i.e., all orders are executed at the same price. If
more than one price maximizes volume, then we assume the transaction price is an arithmetic
average of the candidate prices.
We study a very simple form of this market. One buyer and one seller are matched. Each
trader has the choice between two schedules of limit orders only. The buyer can opt for a rather
unaggressive schedule, denoted by B1. This involves a limit order to buy 8 units if the price is not
above 2, and another order to buy q¯ − 8 additional units if the price is not above 1. Obviously, we
assume that q¯ > 8. Alternatively, he can opt for a more aggressive schedule, for which demand is
shifted upward and which we denote by B2. This involves a limit order to buy 8 units if the price
is not above 3, and another order, to buy q¯ − 8 units if the price is not above 2. Symmetrically, the
seller can choose between two schedules: S1 and S2. The former involves a limit order to sell 8
units if the price is not below 2 and another order to sell q¯− 8 units if the price is not below 3. The
latter involves a limit order to sell 8 units if the price is not below 1 and another order, to sell q¯− 8
units if the price is not below 2. As an illustration, the supply and demand curves corresponding to
these schedules of limit orders for q¯ = 11 are plotted in Figure 1. The players can also choose not
to submit any orders. This is denoted by S0 and B0 for sellers and buyers, respectively.
If both traders opt for aggressive limit orders (S2 and B2), the market clearing price is 2 and
the corresponding volume is q¯. If both traders opt for less aggressive orders (B1 and S1), the price
is still 2, but trading volume is equal to 8. If the buyer is aggressive, but not the seller (B2 and
S1) then trading volume is 8 and the price is pushed up to 2.5. If the seller is aggressive, but not
the buyer (B1 and S2) then again trading volume is 8, but the price is pushed down to 1.5. Thus,
each trader faces a trade-off: He can choose to place an aggressive schedule, potentially generating
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Figure 1: Supply and demand curves when q¯ = 11.
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greater gains, but at the risk of an adverse price move. This risk depends on whether or not the
other trader aggressively provides liquidity. This can be interpreted as liquidity risk.
Discarding S0 and B0, which are weakly dominated, the situation faced by traders in the pure
call auction can be represented as a normal form game, where the payoff of the seller is the first
number in each cell, and the payoff of the buyer is the second number in each cell:
Seller:
Buyer:
B1 B2
S1 (16, 16) (20, 12)
S2 (12, 20) (2q¯, 2q¯)
In the off-diagonal cells, the trader with the less aggressive schedule earns greater gains than
his or her counterparty. Note also that, since q¯ > 8, the pair of actions which maximizes the total
gains from trade is (S2, B2). But will this allocation arise in equilibrium? The answer is given in
the next proposition (whose proof is obvious and omitted).
Proposition 1 Consider the pure call auction. No trade, i.e., (S0, B0), is a Nash equilibrium, but
it involves weakly dominated strategies. If q¯ < 10, then (S1, B1) is the only undominated Nash
equilibrium. If q¯ > 10, there are (on top of the no-trade equilibrium) two pure strategy equilibria:
(S1, B1) and (S2, B2), as well as a mixed strategy equilibrium whereby, each trader selects the
aggressive schedule, S2 or B2, with probability 2/(q¯ − 8).
In our experiment we want to include both the prisoner’s dilemma situation, where the unique
Nash equilibrium is (S1, B1), and the cooperative situation whereby both (S2, B2) and (S1, B1)
are equilibria. Thus, we will consider two possible parameter values: q¯ = 9 and q¯ = 11. In the
latter case, (S2, B2) is Pareto dominant while (S1, B1) is risk dominant.10
2.2 The call auction with a preopening period
While some stock markets operate without formal preopening period, in other bourses there is a
preopening period during which traders can enter limit orders and indicative prices are set and
disseminated. There are no trades at these prices, but investors can observe them. This mechanism
can be useful if, by observing the indicative prices, investors can progressively coordinate on an
equilibrium. But it’s not clear whether such preplay communication can deliver useful and reliable
information. After all, if traders can costlessly place and cancel orders, they have no clear incen-
tives to reveal their true trading intentions and can attempt to manipulate the market. To cope with
10Suppose the buyer has no clue about the actions of the seller and assigns equal probability to the two possible
actions S1 and S2. Then, when q¯ = 11, the expected utility of the buyer if he plays B1 is: 1216 +
1
220 = 18, while
his utility if he plays B2 is: 1212 +
1
222 = 17. Hence, the buyer prefers to play B1.
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this problem, market organizers have designed preopening periods where it can be unattractive or
difficult to cancel manipulative orders. This can involve forbidding cancellations, imposing costs
for traders canceling orders, or opening the market at a random point in time. To study these issues
we consider two types of preopening in our simple setup:
• The first preopening mechanism we consider is a pure cheap talk game, involving nonbinding
orders. At time 0 the buyer and the seller can enter orders S0, S1 or S2 and B0, B1 or B2.
These orders are matched and an indicative price is set, at which there is no trade. All
investors observe the outcome of this preopening round. Then, at time 1, the preopening
orders are cancelled and the traders have a new opportunity to place orders. These time
1 orders are those which will be used to set the opening prices at which actual trades will
occur.
• The second preopening mechanism involves binding orders. It is designed to capture, in a
simple way, attempts by market designers to curb manipulation and noisy preopening orders.
At time 0 the traders can choose to place limit orders S1 or S2 and B1 or B2. Alternatively,
they can choose to place no order (denoted by S0 and B0) and wait for t = 1. The outcome
of this preopening round is observed by all. The difference with the nonbinding preopening
is that when traders have placed orders B1, S1, B2 or S2 at t = 0, they cannot cancel these
initial orders and place new ones. On the other hand, traders who have not placed orders at
t = 0 have the opportunity to place orders at t = 1.
How does the presence of this preopening phase alter behavior and outcomes in our simple
trading game?
When preopening orders are nonbinding, they can be discounted as pure noise by the players.
In that case, actions at t = 0 are irrelevant, and equilibria at t = 1 are the same as in the market
without preopening. On the other hand, players can use preopening orders as communication
devices, and in that case there may be a link between orders placed at t = 0 and orders placed
at t = 1. For example, the agents could agree that, if they played B2 and S2 at t = 0 then they
should also play play B2 and S2 at t = 1. A more complex scheme would be for the agents to use
a jointly controlled lottery, as in Aumann, Maschler and Stearns (1968). For example, the players
could mix between B1 and B2 (or S1 and S2) at t = 0 with equal probability. Then, at t = 1, they
would coordinate on (B2, S2) if they played on the diagonal, i.e., (S1, B1) or (S2, B2) at t = 0.
And they would coordinate on (B1, S1) if they played off the diagonal, i.e., (S1, B2) or (S2, B1)
at t = 0. Whatever the equilibrium prevailing in the market with a nonbinding preopening, the
same equilibrium actions can be observed at t = 1 as without preopening. This is stated in the next
proposition:
7
Proposition 2 (B0, S0), (B2, S2), (B1, S1), (S1, B2) and (S2, B1) at t = 1 are equilibrium
outcomes in the call market preceded by a nonbinding preopening.
With binding preopening orders, when q¯ = 9, there are only two equilibria: (S0, B0) and
(S1, B1), and it does not matter whether the agents place their orders at time 0 or at time 1. But,
when q¯ = 11, things are more involved.
To analyze this case, we focus on subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Thus, we rule out actions
which are strictly dominated at certain nodes of the game. To do this, we first consider the case
where, at time 0, the buyer played B1 and the seller chose to wait (i.e., played S0). Then, playing
S2 or S0 at time 1 would be strictly dominated by the play of S1. Second, we turn to the case
where, at time 0, the buyer played B2 and the seller chose to wait. Then, the play of S1 or S0
at time 1 is strictly dominated by S2. Symmetric arguments apply when the buyer chose to wait
while the seller played either S1 or S2 at time 0. Thus, we can state the following lemma:
Lemma 1 When q¯ = 11 in the market with a binding preopening, the set of choices for the seller
that are not strictly dominated is:
• Play S0 at t = 0.
• Play S1 at t = 0.
• Play S2 at t = 0.
• Wait at t = 0 and then respond S1 if B1 or B0 was played at time and S2 if B2 was played
at time 0. Denote this by ΣS1 .
• Wait at t = 0 and then respond S1 if B1 was played at time and S2 if B2 or B0 was played
at time 0. Denote this by ΣS2 .
Similarly the set of choices that are not strictly dominated for the buyer is B0, B1 or B2 at time 0
and ΣB1 or Σ
B
2 .
Furthermore, note that no trade, i.e., (S0, B0) at time 0 and time 1, cannot be a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium. Suppose the buyer anticipates the seller to wait at time 0, and then to respond
S0 at t = 1 to the play of B0 at t = 0. Then the buyer is better off playing B2 at t = 0.
Thus, to analyze the subgame perfect equilibria in the market with a binding preopening, one
can focus on the following normal form game:
S1 S2 ΣS1 Σ
S
2
B1 (16, 16) (20, 12) (16, 16) (16, 16)
B2 (12, 20) (22, 22) (22, 22) (22, 22)
ΣB1 (16, 16) (22, 22) (16, 16) (20, 12)
ΣB2 (16, 16) (22, 22) (12, 20) (22, 22)
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Inspecting this normal form, one can see that the game admits seven subgame perfect pure
Nash equilibria, as stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 In the market with a binding preopening when q¯ = 11, there are seven subgame
perfect pure Nash equilibria:
• (S1, B1) at t = 0,
• (S2, B2) at t = 0,
• S2 at t = 0 and ΣB1 ,
• S2 at t = 0 and ΣB2 ,
• B2 at t = 0 and ΣS1 ,
• B2 at t = 0 and ΣS2 ,
• (ΣS2 ,ΣB2 ).
The mixed strategy equilibria of the game are stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 4 In the market with a binding preopening when q¯ = 11, there are 2 mixed strategies
subgame perfect Nash equilibria:
• The buyer mixes between B1 at t = 0 and ΣB1 , while the seller mixes between S1 at time 0
and ΣS1 .
• The buyer mixes between B2 at t = 0 and ΣB2 , while the seller mixes between S2 at time 0
and ΣS2 .
Note that, in contrast with the two previous market structures, mixing between B1 and B2 or
S1 and S2 at t = 0 or t = 1 is not an equilibrium. The intuition is the following. Could the buyer
mix between B1 and B2 at t = 0? In that case the seller would be strictly better off playing S0 at
t = 0 and then, at t = 1, play his best response to the realized action of the buyer. But, anticipating
that the seller would wait, the buyer finds it suboptimal to mix at t = 0. Also, mixing between B1
and B2 cannot arise in equilibrium. If the buyer plans to mix between B1 and B2 at time 1, then
he waits at time 0. Anticipating this, the seller is better off playing S2 at time 0. Observing that
decision, the buyer then finds it suboptimal to mix at time 1.
To sharpen further our analysis of the equilibria of this game, we rely on the notion of trembling
hand perfection (Selten, 1975). In the two market structures analyzed above, that concept did not
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rule out any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. But the market with a binding preopening has
a sequential flavour which gives bite to the notion of trembling hand perfection. First note that
playing B1 (resp. S1) at time 0 is weakly dominated by playing ΣB1 (resp. Σ
S
1 ). Thus, trembling
hand perfection rules out the equilibria involving the play of S1 or B1 at time 0. Intuitively, if
there is a small chance that the seller trembles to S2, then the buyer is better off playing ΣB1 than
B1. This leads to our next proposition.
Proposition 5 In the market with a binding preopening when q¯ = 11, the only trembling hand
perfect Nash equilibrium outcome is (S2, B2).
Thus, while Nash equilibrium multiplicity arises in the three market structures, the three games
have distinct stategic properties. When the preopening is binding there is a unique trembling hand
perfect equilibrium outcome, (S2, B2). In contrast, in the pure call auction or with a nonbinding
preopening period, both (S2, B2) and (S1, B1) are trembling hand perfect.
2.3 Hypotheses
2.3.1 Dominant strategy equilibrium and trembling hand perfection
When q¯ = 9, there is a unique undominated equilibrium outcome, whatever the structure of the
trading game. Accordingly we posit the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 When q¯ = 9 we expect the outcome of the game to be (S1, B1) in the three market
structures.
When q¯ = 11, with a binding preopening period there is a unique trembling hand perfect
equilibrium outcome. Accordingly we posit the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 When q¯ = 11 we expect the outcome of the game to be (S2, B2) with a binding
preopening period.
In the lab, Hypothesis 2 may fail to hold if the participants play (S1, B1), (S1,ΣB1 ) or (B1,Σ
S
1 ),
which are subgame perfect equilibria, but not trembling hand perfect. In that sense our experimen-
tal design offers a test of the predictive power of the concept of trembling hand perfection in a
simple context.
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2.3.2 Mismatches
When q¯ = 11, in all the market structures we consider there are multiple subgame perfect Nash
equilibria, with different levels of liquidity and gains from trade. And, while some equilibria are
Pareto dominant, the Pareto dominated outcome is risk dominant. This could make it more dif-
ficult for participants to coordinate on one equilibrium. If the participants fail to achieve such
coordination, we will observe frequent mismatches, with outcomes (S2, B1) or (S1, B2). How-
ever, preplay communication can be expected to facilitate coordination. Thus we expect that, when
there is a preopening period with nonbinding orders, mismatches should be less frequent than in
the pure call market without preopening. Furthermore, we expect mismatches at t = 0 to be even
less frequent when preopening orders are binding since in that case they are not subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium outcomes. Thus we posit the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 When q¯ = 11, the frequency of mismatches, whereby the outcome is (S2, B1) or
(S1, B2), should be greatest in the pure call market without preopening and smallest with binding
preopening orders.
2.3.3 Manipulation
When q¯ = 9, the presence of a nonbinding preopening should have no effect on game outcomes.
Participants should realize that at time 1 their opponent will always play S1 or B1, whatever his or
her initial order. So they should ignore any other preopening order. At the same time, if participants
are unsure whether their opponents conduct such reasoning, they might attempt to manipulate their
beliefs. Thus, when q¯ = 9 and the preopening is not binding, they could place misleading orders,
for example S2 at time 0, hoping their opponent would naively respond with B2 at time 1. If
the manipulation was successful, the players would opportunistically take advantage of such naive
behavior by placing S1 at time 1. And if the manipulation was unsuccessful it would not be costly
to the seller, since it would end up, anyhow, with the equilibrium outcome (S1, B1). Thus we posit
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 When q¯ = 9 and there is a preopening period with nonbinding orders, participants
will place manipulative orders, S2 or B2 at t = 0 and then revert to S1 and B1 at t = 1. But, to
the extent that their opponents are rational, the play of S2 at t = 0 will not increase the frequency
of B2 at t = 1 (and symmetrically on the other side of the market).
This hypothesis is in line with the experimental results of Charness (2000), who studies a pris-
oner’s dilemma with nonbinding preplay communication and finds that players tend to announce
cooperation but then play defection.
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2.3.4 Cheap talk and cooperation
The nonbinding preopening is in fact a cheap talk mechanism. When q¯ = 11, will such cheap
talk foster coordination on the Pareto dominant equilibrium (S2, B2)? Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe
and Ross (1992), Charness (2000) and Blume and Ortmann (2007) show experimentally that, in
games with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria, preplay communication fosters coordination on the
most efficient one. Farrell (1987) and Farrell and Rabin (1996) offer a theoretical argument to
rationalize this. The intuition is the following: Of course, when non equilibrium or dominated
actions are announced, preplay communication is non credible and players ignore it. But, what
if I make an announcement such that if you believe me and respond optimally, then it is in my
own interest to stick to my word? Farell (1987) argues that in this case my announcement should
be credible. Thus, in our game, when q¯ = 11, participants could credibly announce during the
preopening their intention to play (S2, B2) in the call auction. This suggests that the presence of
the preopening period should enhance coordination on the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium and
leads to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5 When q¯ = 11, with a nonbinding preopening period, sellers will tend to play S2
at t = 0 and at t = 1, and buyers will respond to this by playing B2 at t = 1. The symmetric
argument applies to the other side of the market.
Yet, Aumann (1990) offers a counterargument to this conjecture. Suppose I announce I will
play S2 and the buyer believes me. Then he responds with B2. Now, I prefer him to choose this
response irrespective of whether I really want to play B2 or B1. Thus, argues Aumann (1990), my
announcement is not self-enforcing. This suggests it may not be credible and preplay communi-
cation with nonbinding orders may not enhance coordination on the Pareto dominant equilibrium.
This is in line with Clark et al (2001), who consider a game where the Aumann critique applies.
They find that cooperation is played 42% of the time but announced 81% of the time. In our game,
as in theirs, parameters are such that the Aumann’s critique applies.
2.3.5 History
To design their strategies, players need to form beliefs about the moves of their opponents. Such
beliefs are likely to be shaped by the observation of past actions, thus generating history depen-
dence. In the market with a nonbinding preopening period, low initial gains from trades can induce
pessimistic beliefs. In that market, according to Hypothesis 2, even when q¯ = 9, agents will play
S2 or B2 at t = 0, hoping to manipulate their opponent, and then they will play S1 and B1 at
t = 1. Such actions risk undermining the credibility of preplay communication. In that case, even
when the maximum amount traded goes to 11, players might not respond positively to cooperative
messages (S2 or B2) sent at t = 0. Accordingly, we posit the following hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 6 Cooperative messages sent during the nonbinding preopening with q¯ = 11 will
elicit less positive responses when participants have previously played with q¯ = 9.
3 Experimental design
To test these hypotheses, we conducted a market experiment at the Toulouse University laboratory.
We studied participants behavior in three treatments: i) a pure call market without preopening,
ii) a call auction preceded by a nonbinding preopening period, iii) a call auction preceded by
binding preopening orders. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The participants were seated in front of computers separated by dividers
and we enforced a ban on verbal communication. The experiments involved 156 students from
three different master in finance programs at Toulouse University. There were 12 cohorts. The
number of participants per cohort varied between 8 and 20. Each cohort played only in one market
environment.
In each cohort, participants played the market game 15 times. Each time they were randomly
and blindly matched with an opponent, and this was orally announced to all by the experimenter
so that it was common knowledge. Anonymity and random matching ensured that each time
participants would behave as in a one-shot game. Relying on anonymous computerized interaction
with a prespecified set of messages, we avoid the confounding effects associated with face to face
interaction noted by Roth (1995).11
At each round, the computer collected all the choices and randomly matched one seller and one
buyer within a given cohort. Payoffs were determined according to the normal form game table
given above. At the end of each replication, each participant was informed of his or her trading
gains. Subjects were not told with whom they were matched, but they were informed of the actions
of their opponent. The subjects were not informed of the outcomes of the matches in which they
did not participate. When there was a preopening period, the same two players were matched both
for the preopening period and the subsequent call market.
To study the effect of history on behavior, we exposed participants to variations in q¯. In the
first ten cohorts, half the participants first played 5 rounds with q¯ = 11, followed by 5 rounds with
q¯ = 9, and then 5 more rounds with q¯ = 11. For the other participants in these first ten cohorts,
the sequencing was reversed: they first played 5 rounds with q¯ = 9, then 5 rounds with q¯ = 11,
and finally 5 rounds with q¯ = 9. We did not tell the participants what the exact process of q¯ would
be. We just informed them that q¯ would vary between 9 and 11 across rounds and participants.
When q¯ changed, we clearly warned the participants of this alteration in the parameters via screen
11preplay communication in our game takes the form of rather terse, pre-set, messages, such as ”B1” or ”S2”. This
differs from the rich, free-form messages studied by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006).
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messages, to avoid any confusion.
We also wanted to disentangle the pure effect of market structure from its effect combined
with history. To do so, we also ran the experimental market keeping q¯ constant. Since, as will
be clear below, experimental outcomes are quite straightforward when q¯ = 9 and also in the pure
call auction, we ran these control experiments only for q¯ = 11 and for the market with a binding
preopening and that with a nonbinding one. This control treatment enables us to check that, as
predicted by Hypothesis 6, there is a difference between the first five rounds and the next ones for
the cohorts which faced changes in q¯, not for the other ones. It also enables us to examine the
difference between the binding and nonbinding preopening cases in absence of changes in q¯, and
thus to test directly Hypotheses 2,3,4 and 5.
The composition of the cohorts and the treatments are summarized in Table 1. We first ran the
experiment with 7 cohorts, in the context of our original design, which involved the three market
structure and changes in q¯. Then, to check the robustness of the difference between the binding and
nonbinding preopenings, we replicated the experiment for these two market structures (keeping the
changes in q¯ as in the first 7 cohorts). The results obtained for all these cohorts are qualitatively
similar, hence we report results based on pooled data. Finally, to control for the role of variations
in market conditions, we studied the benchmark case where there are no changes in q¯.
In each cohort, we first explained the game to the participants and gave them an instruction
sheet. An example of the instructions, for the pure call auction market, is given in Appendix. We
answered questions to ensure the participants understood the mechanics of the market. At the same
time we carefully avoided giving them any hints as to how they should play. This presentation
phase lasted around thirty minutes. Then the market game took place. First, each cohort went
through 6 practice rounds. Then, the 15 “real” rounds took place. At each round the participants
had 3 minutes to place their orders. In the pure call auction case, this meant they had 3 minutes
to choose which order to place in the call auction. When there was a preopening, participants had
90 seconds to choose the orders they would place during the preopening and then 90 seconds to
place orders in the call auction. We chose this design to ensure that the total decision time would
be the same across all treatments. This way, if superior performance was obtained in markets
with a preopening period, it could not be due to longer decision time. Overall the market game
lasted around one hour and a half for each cohort. The participants were also told that, after the 15
sessions, they would receive a payment in euros equal to their total number of points divided by
15. The average payment was e 18, the minimum was 15 and the maximum 21.
14
4 Results
4.1 Executed orders
Pooling buyers and sellers, Table 2 presents the orders that were taken into account to generate
trades.12 To document the evolution of behavior, the table breaks down the results obtained during
the first five periods, the following five periods, and the last five periods.
Panels A and B depict what happens when participants faced varying parameter values. Panels
A and B correspond to treatments that begin with q¯ = 11 and q¯ = 9, respectively. Panels A2, B1
and B3 correspond to the periods during which q¯ = 9. As stated below, in that case, participants
easily discover the dominant strategy equilibrium, consistent with Hypothesis 1.
Finding 1 When q¯ = 9, the most frequent actions are B1 and S1, with frequencies ranging from
78% in the pure call auction during the first five rounds, to 95.8% in the market with a binding
preopening period during the last five rounds.
Panels A1, A3 and B2 present the findings for q¯ = 11. The most frequent actions are B2 and
S2, corresponding to the Pareto dominant equilibrium, but there are large variations across market
structures and through time. When the participants play with q¯ = 11 during the first five rounds,
the difference between the three market structures is relatively small, as B2 or S2 is played 76%
of the time in the pure call auction, 60.8% when the preopening is nonbinding, and 73, 3% when it
is binding (the difference between the pure call auction and the auction with a binding preopening
is not statistically significant). But, later in the experiment, the performances of the three market
structures diverge.
Consider the case where participants play with q¯ = 11 after having been exposed to q¯ = 9:
• In the pure call auction, the proportion of B2 or S2 is equal to 58% in rounds 6 to 10 (see
Panel B2), and 54% in rounds 11 to 15 (see Panel A3). This is statistically different, at the
5% level, from the frequency observed during the first five rounds (76%).
• In the market where the preopening is nonbinding, the proportion of B2 or S2 is 50.8%
in rounds 6 to 10 (see Panel B2), which is statistically different, at the 5% level, from the
frequency observed during the first five rounds. The proportion of B2 or S2 is 56.7% in
rounds 11 to 15 (see Panel A3). This is lower than, but not statistically different from, the
frequency observed in the first five rounds (60.8%).
12In the pure call auction these are simply the limit orders placed by the agents. In the market with nonbinding
preopening orders, these are the orders placed at time 1 in the call auction. In the market with binding preopening
orders, these are the orders placed by the participants, either at time 0 during the preopening or at time 1 during the
call auction.
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• With a binding preopening, the percentage of B2 or S2 is 87.5% in rounds 6 to 10 (see Panel
B2), and 90.8% in rounds 11 to 15 (see Panel A3), which is even higher than the frequency
observed during the first five rounds (73.3%).
These findings are summarized below:
Finding 2 When q¯ = 11, if players have not previously been exposed to q¯ = 9, the frequency
of B2 and S2 is relatively high. If the players have previously been exposed to q¯ = 9, then the
frequency of B2 or S2 is relatively low in the pure call auction and in the market with a binding
preopening period. But it is quite high in the market with a binding preopening period.
Thus the nonbinding preopening does not increase the play of B2 and S2. This contradicts
Hypothesis 5, and is more in line with the Aumann critique than with the argument of Farell. In
contrast, the preopening facilitates coordination on high liquidity and gains from trade when it
involves binding orders. This is consistent with participants reaching the unique trembling hand
perfect equilibrium outcome, in line with Hypothesis 2.
Panel C of Table 2 presents the results obtained in the benchmark case where q¯ is constant
and equal to 11. Similarly to Panels A and B, we see that the market with a binding preopening
period outperforms the market with a nonbinding period. But, in contrast with Panels A and B, we
observe no difference between the first five rounds and the next five rounds. When the preopening
period is nonbinding, the frequency of B2 or S2 is 43% during the first five rounds and 45% during
the next five rounds. When the preopening period is binding, the frequency of B2 or S2 is 77%
during the first five rounds and 76% during the next five rounds. This confirms that the decline of
the performance of the nonbinding preopening observed in panels B2 and A3 is due to the reaction
of participants to previous bitter experiences. We also observe, in Panel C3 of Table 2 that the
market with a nonbinding preopening performs poorly during the last five rounds. This may reflect
that participants were getting bored after playing more than 10 replications of the same game.
Their behavior at this point contrasts with persistence of the coordination on the Pareto dominant
equilibrium in the market with a binding preopening period, which offers yet another illustration
of the efficiency of the latter market structure.
4.2 Mismatches
The results are in Table 3. When q¯ = 11, the frequency of (S1, B2) or (S2, B1) is statistically
significantly larger, at the 5% level, in the pure call auction than in the market with a nonbinding
preopening. And this frequency is statistically significantly lower with a binding preopening than
with a nonbinding one. These results, which are consistent with Hypothesis 3, are summarized
below:
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Finding 3 Mismatches such as (S1, B2) or (S2, B1) are rather frequent in the pure call auction.
In contrast the presence of a preopening period reduces the occurrence of mismatches, especially
in the market with a binding preopening.
Table 3, also shows that mismatches are more frequent when q¯ = 11 than when q¯ = 9. This
is natural since there are multiple equilibria in the former case and not in the latter (when q¯ =
9, whether the preopening period is binding or not does not statistically affect the frequency of
mismatches).
4.3 Manipulation and coordination during the preopening period
4.3.1 Orders placed during the preopening and the opening
Table 4 documents the evolution of the orders placed by the same player at t = 0 and then t = 1.
Panels A to D present the evidence for the treatment where participants faced changes in q¯. Panels
E and F present the evidence for the control treatment where q¯ was kept constant at 11.
As can be seen in panel A, in the nonbinding preopening period when q¯ = 9, the majority of
the orders (63.6%) is of type B2 or S2. But after sending such “cooperative messages,” the agents
shift to the opposite strategy at t = 1 and play B1 or S1 92.6% of the time. These results, which
are consistent with Hypothesis 4, are summarized below:
Finding 4 When q¯ = 9, in the nonbinding preopening, orders are manipulative: players “an-
nounce cooperation” at t = 0 but “play defection” at t = 1.
In contrast, Panel B of Table 4 shows that in the binding preopening period when q¯ = 9, the
vast majority of the orders (77.8%) is of type B0 or S0 at t = 0. Since playing B2 or S2 during
the preopening would be binding, players cannot try to manipulate their opponent. So they often
choose to wait. After these non-committing orders, in the vast majority of cases (93.2%), players
follow the dominant strategy B1 or S1 at t = 1.
When q¯ = 11, as shown in Panels C and E of Table 4, in the nonbinding preopening period the
majority of the orders is of type B2 or S2 (80.0% in Panel C and 74.3% in Panel E). These orders
tend to be informative since orders placed at t = 1 are related to those placed at t = 0. However
time 0 orders are not always reliable indications of subsequent play, since, at t = 1, agents play
B2 or S2 only 60.1% of the time in Panel C and 43.5% in Panel E.
Panel D and F show that, in the binding preopening period when q¯ = 11, agents often choose
to wait (44.4% of the cases in Panel D and 45.3 % in Panel F). This is likely to reflect uncertainty
about the play of their opponent. Yet, during the binding preopening, a significant fraction of the
orders placed at t = 0 is of type B2 or S2 (52.5% in Panel D and 46% in Panel F). Such orders
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commit the players to B2 or S2 at t = 1. They are likely to reflect coordination by the agents on
the trembling hand perfect equilibrium, consistent with Hypothesis 2.
4.3.2 The response to preopening orders
Table 5 documents how the players responded at time 1 to the order posted by their opponent during
the preopening. Again Panels A to D present the evidence for the treatment where participants
faced changes in q¯, while Panels E and F present the evidence for the control treatment where q¯
was kept constant at 11.
When q¯ = 9, as shown in Panel A, in the market with a nonbinding preopening period, agents’
actions at t = 1 are not affected by their opponent’s move at t = 0. In the vast majority of cases,
the agents play S1 or B1 at t = 1. The play of B2 or S2 at t = 0 by their opponent does not
induce them to play B2 or S2 at t = 1. This result, which is consistent with Hypothesis 4, is stated
below:
Finding 5 In the nonbinding preopening, when q¯ = 9, attempts to manipulate are frequent but
ineffective.
Panel B presents the results obtained in the market with a binding preopening when q¯ = 9. This
panel reports the choices made at time 1 by participants who chose to wait at time 0 (the others
are committed by their time 0 move and therefore have no opportunity to respond.) In that market
also, the vast majority of agents respond B1 or S1 at t = 1, whatever the move of their opponent
at time 0. Thus, participants play dominant strategies, consistent with Hypothesis 1.
When q¯ = 11, as shown in Panels C and E of Table 5, in the market with a nonbinding
preopening period, agents tend to be responsive to the order placed by their opponent at time
0. When the preopening order of their opponent was B1 or S1, they play B1 or S1 85.4% of the
time in Panel C and 82.1% in Panel E. When the preopening order of their opponent was B2 or S2,
they play B2 or S2 62.8% of the time in Panel C and 46.6% in Panel E. Thus, the response to the
play of B2 or S2 during the preopening tends to be weak. This suggests participants don’t place a
lot of trust in the preopening orders.
Panels D and F present, for the binding preopening and q¯ = 11, the choices made at time 1 by
participants who chose to wait at time 0. The response to B1 or S1 (100% of S1 or B1 in Panel
D and 81.8% in Panel F) and the response to B2 or S2 (81.9% of S2 or B2 in Panel D and 91.3%
in Panel F) show that players best respond. Since players rarely choose to play B1 or S1 at date
t = 0, this result again illustrates that the binding preopening is effective at fostering coordination
on the Pareto dominant outcome, consistent with Hypothesis 2.
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4.4 History dependence
Tables 6, 7 and 8 show the evolution of the response of the players to the order posted by their
opponent during the preopening.13 Table 6 documents the case where the maximum trade was
11 during the first five rounds, changed to 9 during the next five rounds, and finally reverted to
11 during the last 5 rounds. Table 7 presents the evidence for the other possible sequence, for
which the maximum trade was 9 during the first five rounds, 11 during the next five rounds, and
9 during the last 5 rounds. The first type of sequence corresponds to the case where the agents
started interacting in rather good market conditions (q¯ = 11), where high gains from trade could
be achieved in equilibrium. In contrast, the second type of sequence started with tough market
conditions (q¯ = 9), where equilibrium generated low gains from trade. Finally, Table 8 presents
the evidence for the treatment where q¯ was constant and equal to 11 during the 15 rounds.
4.4.1 The market with a nonbinding preopening period
Panel A of Table 6 shows that during the first five rounds, when the maximum trade is 11, so that
there are two Nash equilibria (S1, B1) and (S2, B2), the messages sent during the nonbinding
preopening period influence actions at t = 1. When their opponent played B1 or S1 during the
preopening period, agents play B1 or S1 77.8% of the time. And when their opponent played B2
or S2 during the preopening period, agents play B2 or S2 69.6% of the time.14
This contrasts with Panel B of Table 7, which shows the responses observed during rounds 5
to 10, when the maximum trade is currently 11, but the agents have experienced q¯ = 9 during the
first 5 rounds. In that case the play of B1 or S1 during the preopening does elicit the response B1
or S1 at t = 1. But when their opponent played B2 or S2 during the preopening, agents respond
with B2 or S2 at t = 1 only 57.7% of the time. A Chi–square test reveals that this is statistically
different, at the 5% level, from the frequency observed during the first five rounds, i.e., 69.6%.
During the first five rounds, these agents have observed manipulative announces of B2 or S2 at
t = 0, followed by the play of B1 or S1 at t = 1. Thus they have lost faith in the credibility of
“cooperative messages” sent during the preopening. Hence, consistent with Hypothesis 6, the play
of B2 or S2 during the preopening period often fails to elicit a positive B2 or S2 response.
A similar but less strong phenomenon is documented in Panel C of Table 6, which shows the
responses observed during rounds 11 to 15, when the maximum trade is currently 11, but was
9 during the previous market phase. These agents have experienced fruitful cooperation during
the first five rounds of the game, and then manipulative messages during the next five rounds.
13Again, for the binding preopening case, we consider the time 1 choices of participants who played B0 or S0 at
time 0. The others are committed by their time 0 moves, and therefore cannot respond to preopening orders.
14A Chi–square test reveals that the frequency of B2 or S2 is statistically significantly different (at the 5% level) in
the two cases.
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Correspondingly, on observing that their opponent played B2 or S2 during the preopening period,
they respond B2 or S2 61.6% of the time. This is below the strong positive response rate which
prevailed for those agents during the first five periods (69.6%) but this difference is significant at
the 10% level only. And it is not significantly above the weak response rate (57.7%) prevailing
during rounds 6 to 10, for agents who had started the games with five rounds of tough market
conditions, with q¯ = 9.
Table 8 presents the evidence for the control treatment where q¯ is constant and equal to 11.
As in the other cases, agents tend to respond B1 to S1 and S1 to B1. The extent to which they
respond positively to B2 or S2 is relatively limited. But, in contrast with the evidence in Tables 6
and 7, there is no decline in the frequency of positive responses from the first five periods the next
five periods. Quite to the contrary there is an increase: During the first five periods, after observing
B2 or S2, participants respond S2 or B2 52.1% of the time. During the next five periods, the
frequency of such positive responses rises non significantly to 56.6%. It must be noted, however,
that there is an eventual decline in the frequency of positive responses, during the last five rounds.
These results, which are consistent with Hypothesis 6, are summarized below:
Finding 6 In the nonbinding preopening, when q¯ = 11, the positive response elicited by the play
of B2 or S2 at time 0 is weaker when participants have previously been exposed to q¯ = 9 than
when they have not.
4.4.2 The market with a binding preopening period
Interestingly, the evolution of play is quite different in the market with a binding preopening period.
There, when q¯ = 11, the frequency of positive responses to B2 or S2 during the preopening is
70.4% during the first five rounds (see Table 6 Panel A), 93.8% during the next five rounds (see
Table 7, Panel B) and 80% during the last five rounds (see Table 6, Panel C). These results, which
are in line with Hypothesis 2, are summarized below:
Finding 7 When the preopening is binding and q¯ = 11, coordination on the Pareto dominant
equilibrium is robust to tough market conditions, as the frequency of B2 or S2 remains high after
agents have experienced markets with q¯ = 9.
The difference between the two types of preopening periods directly manifests itself only when
q¯ = 11. When q¯ = 9, (S1, B1) is a dominant strategy equilibrium, and this equilibrium arises
irrespective of the market structure. But the behavior of the participants during the preopening
when q¯ = 9 has indirect effects, since it influences their beliefs and consequently their actions at
later stages in the game. Table 8 shows that the frequency of positive responses to B2 or S2 is also
very large in the control treatment where q¯ is constant.
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5 Conclusion
We study experimentally the performance of three trading mechanisms: i) a pure call auction, ii) a
nonbinding preopening period followed by a call auction, and iii) a binding preopening period fol-
lowed by a call auction. We investigate whether the preopening period facilitates coordination on
the Pareto dominant equilibrium and how its role is affected by the evolution of market conditions.
We find that, with a nonbinding preopening period, agents try to manipulate their opponents
by sending noncredible, falsely “cooperative,” messages. While these messages don’t fool traders,
they reduce the credibility of preopening orders. Thus, in the market with a nonbinding preopening
period, gains from trade are relatively low. In contrast, by construction, the binding preopening
period is immune to manipulation. It enables traders to achieve high coordination and gains from
trade.
While our analysis suggests that the poor performance of the nonbinding preopening is due to
agents learning to distrust announces, we don’t formally model learning or beliefs formation. It
would be interesting, in future research to analyze such beliefs dynamics. To conduct this analysis,
one could rely on the models of learning dynamics in coordination games offered by Crawford and
Haller (1990) and Crawford (1995).
Our experiment offers a warning to market designers. Purely nonbinding preopening mecha-
nisms can be destabilized by manipulative traders. In contexts where gains from trade are limited,
traders can be tempted to use preplay communication in an opportunistic way. This could have a
long-lasting negative effect on the credibility and usefulness of the preopening period. But market
organizers can strive to design effective communication mechanisms to cope with this problem.
Admittedly, the fully binding preopening mechanism considered in the present paper is a rather
coarse solution. In practice, market designers might find it more effective to rely on less simplistic
methods. For example, in several markets (e.g. the German stock market Xetra), the actual time
of the opening is random. Thus, preopening orders end up being firm orders with some probabil-
ity, when the market opens before the order could be cancelled. Other methods are to constrain
the ability of the traders to revise their orders. For example, in some markets, orders can be can-
celled only if they are replaced with new orders providing more liquidity to the market. Or market
designers can impose a fee on cancellations taking place during the preopening period.
Our results should nevertheless be taken with a grain of salt. Our trading game is highly
stylized. Other important effects are likely to be at play in real markets and affect the usefulness
of preopening mechanisms. In particular, in our experiment, while there is strategic uncertainty
(about the actions of the others), there is no uncertainty about parameters of the game, such as the
maximum level of trade or the value of the asset. Introducing such uncertainty would enrich the
analysis and the potential role of the preopening period. We leave these issues for further research.
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Appendix: Instructions to participants, in the pure call market (without a preopening)
In this market you can place buy or sell limit orders in a uniform price call auction. If you play astutely
you can make some good money. Buyers start with no share. Each share they buy is worth 4 points for them.
Sellers start each trading round with a new endowment of 9 or 11 shares. For them each share is worth 0
point. All traders know how many shares the seller has. There is no link between periods. Cash or shares
are not carried over from one period to the next. At the end of each round we compute profits. For buyers
this is: number shares bought ×(4− price). For sellers this is: number of shares sold × price. At the end of
the experiment you receive in e your profit divided by 15. Only profits matter (as opposed to total wealth)
and buyers are assumed to have enough cash to pay for the shares they want to acquire.
At each trading round, each buyer is randomly & anonymously matched with one seller. Prices & trades
are set in a uniform price call auction, crossing the buy & sell orders. For each pair, the supply curve of
seller & the demand function of the buyer are crossed in a uniform price call auction, setting the price &
volume for this round & this pair of traders.
At each round, each seller chooses between 3 schedules of limit orders:
• S0: Don’t sell at any price,
• S1: One order to sell 8 shares if price not below 2; another order to sell X additional shares if price
not below 3,
• S2: One order to sell 8 shares if price not below 1; another order to sell additional X shares if price
not below 2,
and each buyer chooses between 3 schedules of limit orders.
• B0: Don’t want to buy at any price,
• B1: One limit order to buy 8 shares if the price is not above 2; another limit order to buy X additional
shares if the price is not above 1,
• B2: One limit order to buy 8 shares if the price is not above 3; another limit order to buy X additional
shares if the price is not above 2.
When the maximum trade is 11, then X = 3. When the maximum trade is 9, X = 1.
When the maximum trade is 11 shares, the possible trades and profits are the following:
• B0 or S0: no trade, profits = 0.
• B2 & S2: price = 2, volume = 11. Profit of buyer = profit of seller = 22.
• B1 & S1: price = 2, volume = 8. Profit of buyer = profit of seller = 16.
• B1 & S2: price = 1.5, volume = 8. Profit of buyer = 20, profit of seller = 12.
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• B2 & S1: price = 2.5, volume = 8. Profit of buyer = 12, profit of seller = 20.
When the maximum trade is 9 shares, the possible trades and profits are the following:
• B0 or S0: no trade, profits = 0.
• B2 & S2: price = 2, volume = 9. Profit of buyer = profit of seller = 18.
• B1 & S1: price = 2, volume = 8. Profit of buyer = profit of seller = 16.
• B1 & S2: price = 1.5, volume = 8. Profit of buyer = 20, profit of seller = 12.
• B2 & S1: price = 2.5, volume = 8. Profit of buyer = 12, profit of seller = 20.
We will start with 6 warm up rounds, so that you can familiarize with the game (no points will be earned
during these 6 rounds). During these 6 rounds you’ll sometimes be a buyer and sometimes a seller. Then,
there will be 15 trading rounds, during which you’ll earn e. The number of e you will earn will be your
total accumulated profit/15. At the beginning of the 15 rounds, you will be assigned a role: buyer or seller,
which you’ll keep throughout the game. In some rounds the maximum trade will be 9 shares, in others max
number of shares traded will be 11. At each round, before players choose orders, the maximum trade will
be announced to all.
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Table 1: Cohorts and participants in the experiment
Cohort number Market structure q¯ Number of participants
1 Without preopening 9 or 11 12
2 nonbinding preopening 9 or 11 12
3 nonbinding preopening 9 or 11 12
4 Without preopening 9 or 11 8
5 nonbinding preopening 9 or 11 8
6 Binding preopening 9 or 11 8
7 Binding preopening 9 or 11 8
8 Binding preopening 9 or 11 16
9 nonbinding preopening 9 or 11 16
10 Binding preopening 9 or 11 16
11 nonbinding preopening 11 20
12 Binding preopening 11 20
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Table 2: Outcomes of the game
Panel A1: Rounds 1 to 5, q¯ = 11
Pure Call Auction Call Auction following Call Auction following
Order type Without preopening nonbinding Preopening Binding Preopening
B0 or S0 - - -
B1 or S1 24.0% 39.2% 26.7%
B2 or S2 76.0% 60.8% 73.3%
Panel A2: Rounds 6 to 10, q¯ = 9
Pure Call Auction Call Auction following Call Auction following
Order type Without preopening nonbinding Preopening Binding Preopening
B0 or S0 - - 0.8%
B1 or S1 84.0% 90.8% 89.2%
B2 or S2 16.0% 9.2% 10.0%
Panel A3: Rounds 11 to 15, q¯ = 11
Pure Call Auction Call Auction following Call Auction following
Order type Without preopening nonbinding Preopening Binding Preopening
B0 or S0 - - 0.8%
B1 or S1 46.0% 43.3% 8.3%
B2 or S2 54.0% 56.7% 90.8%
Panel B1: Rounds 1 to 5, q¯ = 9
Pure Call Auction Call Auction following Call Auction following
Order type Without preopening nonbinding Preopening Binding Preopening
B0 or S0 - - 0.8%
B1 or S1 78.0% 88.3% 79.2%
B2 or S2 22.0% 11.7% 20.0%
Panel B2: Rounds 6 to 10, q¯ = 11
Pure Call Auction Call Auction following Call Auction following
Order type Without preopening nonbinding Preopening Binding Preopening
B0 or S0 - - 0.8%
B1 or S1 42.0% 49.2% 11.7%
B2 or S2 58.0% 50.8% 87.5%
Panel B3: Rounds 11 to 15, q¯ = 9
Pure Call Auction Call Auction following Call Auction following
Order type Without preopening nonbinding Preopening Binding Preopening
B0 or S0 2.0% - 0.8%
B1 or S1 84.0% 93.3% 95.8%
B2 or S2 14.0% 6.7% 3.3%
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Table 2: Outcomes of the game (cont)
Panel C1: Benchmark case, rounds 1 to 5, q¯ = 11
Call Auction following Call Auction following
Order type nonbinding Preopening Binding Preopening
B0 or S0 3.0% -
B1 or S1 54.0% 23.0%
B2 or S2 43.0% 77.0%
Panel C2: Benchmark case, rounds 6 to 10, q¯ = 11
Call Auction following Call Auction following
Order type nonbinding Preopening Binding Preopening
B0 or S0 1.0% -
B1 or S1 54.0% 24.0%
B2 or S2 45.0% 76.0%
Panel C3: Benchmark case, rounds 11 to 15, q¯ = 11
Call Auction following Call Auction following
Order type nonbinding Preopening Binding Preopening
B0 or S0 - 1.0 %
B1 or S1 74.0% 31.0 %
B2 or S2 26.0% 68.0 %
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Table 3: Matches
Panel A: Matches when q¯ = 9
Pure Call Auction Call Auction following Call Auction following
Match Without preopening nonbinding Preopening Binding Preopening
(S1, B1) 66.7% 82.2% 78.3%
(S1, B2) or (S2, B1) 29.3% 17.2% 17.8%
(S2, B2) 2.7% 0.6% 2.2%
with B0 or S0 1.3% - 1.7%
Panel B1: Matches when q¯ = 11
Pure Call Auction Call Auction following Call Auction following
Match Without preopening nonbinding Preopening Binding Preopening
(S1, B1) 14.7% 27.2% 7.2%
(S1, B2) or (S2, B1) 45.3% 33.3% 16.7%
(S2, B2) 40.0% 39.4% 75.0%
with B0 or S0 - - 1.1%
Panel B2: Benchmark case, q¯ = 11
Call Auction following Call Auction following
Match nonbinding Preopening Binding Preopening
(S1, B1) 40.0% 16.0%
(S1, B2) or (S2, B1) 38.7% 19.3%
(S2, B2) 18.7% 64.0%
with B0 or S0 2.7% 0.7%
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Table 4: Preopening orders and following actions by the same player
Panel A: nonbinding preopening q¯ = 9
My play at t = 1
My play at t = 0 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2 % obs.
B0 or S0 - 92.3% 7.7% 7.2%
B1 or S1 - 86.7% 13.3% 29.2%
B2 or S2 - 92.6% 7.4% 63.6%
Panel B: Binding preopening q¯ = 9
My play at t = 1
My play at t = 0 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2 % obs.
B0 or S0 1.1% 93.2% 5.7% 77.8%
B1 or S1 - 100% - 15.6%
B2 or S2 - - 100% 6.7%
Panel C: nonbinding preopening q¯ = 11
My play at t = 1
My play at t = 0 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2 % obs.
B0 or S0 - 45.8% 54.2% 6.7%
B1 or S1 - 66.7% 33.3% 13.3%
B2 or S2 - 39.9% 60.1% 80.0%
Panel D: Binding preopening q¯ = 11
My play at t = 1
My play at t = 0 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2 % obs.
B0 or S0 1.3% 28.1% 70.6% 44.4%
B1 or S1 - 100% - 3.1%
B2 or S2 - - 100% 52.5%
Panel E: Benchmark case, nonbinding preopening q¯ = 11
My play at t = 1
My play at t = 0 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2 % obs.
B0 or S0 10.0% 70.0% 20.0% 3.3%
B1 or S1 1.5% 76.1% 22.4% 22.3%
B2 or S2 0.9% 55.6% 43.5% 74.3%
Panel F: Benchmark case, binding preopening q¯ = 11
My play at t = 1
My play at t = 0 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2 % obs.
B0 or S0 0.7% 38.2% 61.0% 45.3%
B1 or S1 - 100% - 8.7%
B2 or S2 - - 100% 46.0%
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Table 5: Response to preopening orders
Panel A: nonbinding preopening q¯ = 9
My play at t = 1
My opponent at t = 0 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2 % obs.
B0 or S0 - 96.2% 3.8% 7.2%
B1 or S1 - 89.5% 10.5% 29.2%
B2 or S2 - 90.8% 9.2% 63.6%
Panel B: Binding preopening q¯ = 9
My play at t = 1
My opponent at t = 0 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2 % obs.
B0 or S0 1.4% 92.4% 6.2% 75.0%
B1 or S1 - 96.1% 3.9% 18.2%
B2 or S2 - 94.7% 5.3% 6.8%
Panel C: nonbinding preopening q¯ = 11
My play at t = 1
My opponent at t = 0 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2 % obs.
B0 or S0 - 41.7% 58.3% 6.7%
B1 or S1 - 85.4% 14.6% 13.3%
B2 or S2 - 37.2% 62.8% 80.0%
Panel D: Binding preopening q¯ = 11
My play at t = 1
My opponent at t = 0 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2 % obs.
B0 or S0 1.7% 38.3% 60.0% 37.5%
B1 or S1 - 100.0% - 3.8%
B2 or S2 1.1% 17.0% 81.9% 58.8%
Panel E: Benchmark case, nonbinding preopening q¯ = 11
My play at t = 1
My opponent at t = 0 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2 % obs.
B0 or S0 - 100% - 3.3%
B1 or S1 3.0% 82.1% 14.9% 22.3%
B2 or S2 0.9% 52.5% 46.6% 74.3%
Panel F: Benchmark case, binding preopening q¯ = 11
My play at t = 1
My opponent at t = 0 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2 % obs.
B0 or S0 1.8% 66.1% 32.1% 41.2%
B1 or S1 - 81.8% 18.2% 8.1%
B2 or S2 - 8.7% 91.3% 50.7%
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Table 6: Evolution of response to preopening orders
The first 5 rounds were played with q¯ = 11, the next 5 rounds with q¯ = 9, and the last 5 rounds
with q¯ = 11.
Panel A: Rounds 1 to 5, q¯ = 11
Preopening
nonbinding Binding
My opponent My play at t = 1 My play at t = 1
at t = 0 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2
B0 or S0 - 50.0% 50.0% - 43.3% 56.7%
B1 or S1 - 77.8% 22.2% - 100.0% -
B2 or S2 - 30.4% 69.6% - 29.6% 70.4%
Panel B: Rounds 6 to 10, q¯ = 9
Preopening
nonbinding Binding
My opponent My play at t = 1 My play at t = 1
at t = 0 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2
B0 or S0 - 90.0% 10.0% 1.4% 95.7% 2.9%
B1 or S1 - 100.0% - - 100.0% -
B2 or S2 - 89.0% 11.0% - 100.0% -
Panel C: Rounds 11 to 15, q¯ = 11
Preopening
nonbinding Binding
My opponent My play at t = 1 My play at t = 1
at t = 0 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2
B0 or S0 - 14.3% 85.7% - 40.0% 60.0%
B1 or S1 - 92.9% 7.1% - - -
B2 or S2 - 38.4% 61.6% 2.9% 17.1% 80.0%
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Table 7: Evolution of response to preopening orders
The first 5 rounds were played with q¯ = 9, the next 5 rounds with q¯ = 11, and the last 5 rounds
with q¯ = 9.
Panel A: Rounds 1 to 5, q¯ = 9
Preopening
nonbinding Binding
My opponent My play at t = 1 My play at t = 1
at t = 0 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2
B0 or S0 - 100.0% - 1.6% 82.3% 16.1%
B1 or S1 - 83.7% 16.3% - 89.5% 10.5%
B2 or S2 - 90.1% 9.9% - 85.7% 14.3%
Panel B: Rounds 6 to 10, q¯ = 11
Preopening
nonbinding Binding
My opponent My play at t = 1 My play at t = 1
at t = 0 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2
B0 or S0 - 57.1% 42.9% 5.0% 30.0% 65.0%
B1 or S1 - 87.5% 12.5% - 100.0% -
B2 or S2 - 42.3% 57.7% - 6.3% 93.8%
Panel C: Rounds 11 to 15, q¯ = 9
Preopening
nonbinding Binding
My opponent My play at t = 1 My play at t = 1
at t = 0 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2
B0 or S0 - 100.0% - 1.3% 97.4% 1.3%
B1 or S1 - 90.7% 9.3% - 100.0% -
B2 or S2 - 94.0% 6.0% - 100.0% -
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Table 8: Evolution of response to preopening orders
Benchmark case: the 15 rounds were played with q¯ = 11.
Panel A: Rounds 1 to 5, q¯ = 11
Preopening
nonbinding Binding
My opponent My play at t = 1 My play at t = 1
at t = 0 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2
B0 or S0 - 100.0% - - 55.0% 45.0%
B1 or S1 7.4% 70.4% 22.2% - 100% -
B2 or S2 1.4% 46.5% 52.1% - 4.0% 96.0%
Panel B: Rounds 6 to 10, q¯ = 11
Preopening
nonbinding Binding
My opponent My play at t = 1 My play at t = 1
at t = 0 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2
B0 or S0 - 100.0% - - 65.0% 35.0%
B1 or S1 - 90.5% 9.5% - 75.0% 25.0%
B2 or S2 1.3% 42.1% 56.6% - 4.8% 95.2%
Panel C: Rounds 11 to 15, q¯ = 11
Preopening
nonbinding Binding
My opponent My play at t = 1 My play at t = 1
at t = 0 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2 B0 or S0 B1 or S1 B2 or S2
B0 or S0 - 100.0% - 6.3% 81.3% 12.5%
B1 or S1 - 89.5% 10.5% - 75.0% 25.0%
B2 or S2 - 68.4% 31.6% - 17.4% 82.6%
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